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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between parent and subsidiary companies belonging to the same undertaking is of significance to EU competition matters. Further, EU law permits the Commission wide discretion in allocating fines among companies which, though legally distinct, belong to the same undertaking. As such, the Commission can and will make parent companies financially liable for the anti-competitive (in particular, cartel) activities of their subsidiaries. Mitigating what might be an otherwise unfettered ability to allocate fines within corporate groups is the notion that personal responsibility must underlie any attribution of a fine. In scrutinising parental-subsidiary conduct, the main focus of the Commission and the EU Courts to date has been on positive control (i.e., the parent's ability to compel the subsidiary to act in a given way). Negative control (i.e., the parent's ability to prevent its subsidiary from action) is much ignored. This focus on positive control has resulted in an unsatisfactory state of affairs for at least three reasons. First, Article 23 (1) and (2) very real way, the relationship of a parent and subsidiary is a further instance of the principalagent relationship (with attendant moral hazards) endemic in corporate control.
In this article, we argue that an extension of EU parental liability in competition matters is appropriate. Our suggestion is to include liability for negligent oversight of subsidiaries and sub-contractors which will provide for a more effective antitrust compliance regime. Incentivising parental firms to oversee their subsidiaries (irrespective of their actual ownership level of them and including liability for failure in control) will enhance antitrust enforcement. This is done by establishing incentives to internalise much of the costs of antitrust enforcement, in the same way that attributing liability to undertakings for the antitrust violations of their employees enhances such compliance. Though there may be some related case law, 5 the paucity of litigated matters may reflect the Commission's enforcement policy. If indeed this is the case, we submit, this policy needs to be reconsidered.
This article is structured in five parts. In the first part arraigned in two sections, we examine the present understanding of "undertaking" in EU competition law within the context of the corporate group. The first section of this part is primarily descriptive. It shows that individual firms and groups of firms consisting of several legally distinct entities have been regarded as (single) undertakings in EU competition law; and the unifying concept in this understanding of "undertaking" is control. In 101 and 102 matters, the focus has been on the ability to control decisions in a positive way: to direct a certain course of conduct.
Although this positive conception of control is also present in the merger context, that context adds a negative element to its understanding: the ability to prevent or block certain courses of action. In the second section of part one, we briefly relate this understanding of control and its relationship to an undertaking to the theoretical understanding of a firm, showing the consistency of this description of EU law with this understanding. Issues of control within a firm lead to a principal-agent problem, in which the agent's conduct may not coincide with the principal's interests. This is the genesis of much corporate delinquency. The third section of this part thus introduces principal-agent analysis, which is used as the analytic tool in the remainder of the article.
In part two, we examine failure of the principal to control the activities of its agent as a basis for antitrust liability. We propose that a failure by the principal (e g a parent firm) to exercise negative control over its agents (subsidiaries) can be a sufficient ground on which to base antitrust liability. we argue that not only is this position consistent with existing EU law, since it is justified first by the wording of Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 which frames liability for competition infringements in terms of an undertaking's intentional activities or its negligence. As such, attributing liability on the basis of negligence is consistent with the existing state of EU secondary legislation. Second, it is also justified in terms of common European legal principles. As European legal systems in general use negligence to found criminal liability, the extension of liability for negligent oversight of a subsidiary's affairs is not inconsistent with the general principles of European law. Moreover, this sort of negligence, we argue, is a sufficient basis for the "personal responsibility" required to found
European antitrust liability.
In part three, we develop an argument for founding liability of failure to exercise control. This argument uses an explicit law and economics methodology based upon our earlier principal-agent analysis. Our argument proceeds on the basis that a corporate liability regime should achieve two goals. First, it should internalise compliance and social costs to the organisation, but should do so with out requiring that organisation to incur wasteful expenditures. A strict liability regime would accomplish the former, and a negligence-based regime achieves the latter. However, neither of these two goals is sufficient to ensure that all wrongdoing will be captured. With a negligence regime, there will always be a residual quantity of harm which is inefficient to prevent (as the prevention of this harm requires wasteful expenditure of resources). A strict liability regime may set up a perverse incentive to avoid the detection of significant harms, to avoid the enhanced liability which may ensue if it attempted to eradicate all harms. With this in mind, we suggest a regime which uses strict liability to attribute conduct to organisations, but includes a negligence-based "defence" to ensure efficient use of resources.
This focus of this model is to shift the focus of legal analysis to the links by which a parent can (or should) exercise control over its subsidiary the degree of ownership becomes less relevant than at present. A consequence of this is investment on compliance by the parent. By internalising these costs, the public authorities need to expend less on investigation to achieve the same overall level of antitrust enforcement. Accordingly, the test for parental liability should not be "decisive influence" but rather should focus on the efforts that the parent did, did not, or could have undertaken to influence its subsidiary's conduct.
This fourth section concludes with an examination of the consistency of the developed model with the existing state of EU law. This provides for not just an assessment of the model, but also a basis for suggested improvements to the state of the law.
Part four applies the above model of liability to the current state of EU competition law. It critically examines three sets of cases: parental liability for the conduct of subsidiaries; the liability which contractors have for the anti-competitive conduct of their subcontractors; and potential liability which financial companies may have for their pure passive holding of companies which may be "parked" with them. The results of this examination
show that the suggested model would attribute liability to parents and contractors in slightly more cases than is the case under present EU law. In the case of pure passive holdings, the proposed model would not attribute liability for the "parked" firm's conduct, thereby being consistent with existing law and recognising the benefits obtained through non-attribution.
The article concludes by showing that our suggestions are not just "ivory tower"
theorising. Rather the proposals we develop can readily be imported into the existing EU competition enforcement system. All that is lacking is the will to do so.
At the outset, we make a definitional point. In the course of this article we will use the term "vicarious liability." We use this to describe the attribution of liability of the sort which takes place when a firm is responsible for the actions of its employees. In other words, the actions of one party are attributed to another party, with the latter being responsible for them. We will also use the phrase "absolute liability" to connote the circumstances where the commission of the act alone is sufficient for blame and hence legal responsibility to attach to the act.
THE UNDERSTANDING OF "UNDERTAKING" IN EU LAW (a) Undertakings and Control: The Case Law
As a jurisdictional concept in EU competition law, one of the first lines of inquiry in any antitrust matter will be on the nature of the undertakings involved. It is also trite to note that in EU competition law, an undertaking is any "entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed." 6 The legal personalities of members of corporate groups are irrelevant. A corporate group will be a single undertaking if subsidiary companies do not have the ability to pursue an independent course of action on the market, due to the control which the parent company exerts over the subsidiaries. In the context of 101 and 102 analysis, the focus has been on positive control, i.e. the extent to which a parent can direct the conduct of a subsidiary.
Positive control and hence its implication for viewing a corporate group as a single entity/undertaking is vividly seen in Viho. 7 At issue was Parker Pen's strategy of partitioning the internal market through the use of wholly owned subsidiaries. These subsidiaries in turn took instructions from the parent company in their market conduct. 8 As a result of the subsidiary's lack of independence, they were found to be part of the same undertaking as their parent, thus there could be no breach of Article 85 (now 101). Similarly, in Arkema the ECJ indicated that if a subsidiary "carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities" 9 then "the parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit and therefore form a single undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC… ."
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To facilitate proof of control, the Court in its case law accepts a rebuttable presumption of control when a parent company holds 100% of the shares of the subsidiary.
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Adducing evidence of the subsidiary's independent conduct on the market rebuts the presumption of control. 12 Further subsequent case law has shown that the presumption of 100% ownership can be relaxed. In Arkema, the percentage was 98, and neither the lawfulness nor the applicability of the presumption was disputed in that case. 
(b) The Firm and Control
There is a link between the nature of the firm and control. One leading textbook describes firms as "single decision making units that maximize profits." 37 Although its emphasis on singularity in the definition begs our question of when two entities belong to the same undertaking/firm, the shift to profit maximisation yields a clue as to firm unity. This clue is found in the element of control and the ability to implement a profit maximising strategy.
While a survey of theories of the firm is beyond our present scope, 38 it should be noted that a classical theory of the firm views a "firm [as] a set of feasible production plans
[with] a manager presid[ing] over this production set." 39 Control is, of course, manifested in the manager's ability to determine, and put into place, the profit-maximising production plan. Columbia Law Review 1757 for a concise survey, on which the present discussion draws. 39 Ibid 1758.
In a more sophisticated version of the classical theory, the principal-agent analysis of the firm 40 explains divergence of ownership and management interests. Under this analysis, the firm is a set of production plans. However, in contrast to the classical theory, principalagent analysis focuses on the misalignment of interest between owners and managers. This analysis holds that owners cannot implement their profit maximising strategy directly, but require the intermediation of management. Given that managers have their own utility functions which differ from the owners', and that managers will satisfy these functions to the extent that they can get away with, 41 an inevitable conflict between ownership and management will arise. As with the classical theory of the firm, the notion of control underlies principal-agent analysis. In contrast to the classical theory, the focus of control in the principal-agent analysis is in the ability of management to control (or divert) the firm's resources to satisfy managements' utility function as opposed to the owners' demands to profit-maximise.
Similar principal-agent issues arise when the firm is analysed from a Coasian transaction costs perspective. 42 The usual application of this analysis is in regard to vertical integration, which views a firm as a means of minimising the transaction costs involved in the "make or buy" decision. Consider a party which produces widgets. It requires input for the widgets and needs to market these products. It can choose to produce or purchase raw materials for widgets. Likewise, it can market the widgets itself, or pay others to do so.
"Buying" or outsourcing any element of the production of the widget involves transaction costs, in particular negotiating the terms of the contract and monitoring the other party's compliance with these contractual terms. Accordingly the solution to the "make or buy" decision will be made in the interests of reducing transaction costs, and involves dictating the terms of the transaction. There is no need to restrict this analysis to vertical arrangements, as similar considerations may be found horizontally. A firm may choose to enter a new market, and in the absence of doing that itself, may, inter alia, use a subsidiary or a franchisee, subcontract this process or hire a commercial agent to represent it in the new market. relative cost of each alternative will drive the choice of arrangement. But in each of these arrangements (with the exception of the firm doing it itself) principal-agent tensions arises, as the parties' interests may not be perfectly aligned.
By isolating the tension between ownership and managerial interests, principal-agent analysis of the firm is a useful diagnostic tool to study corporate misdeeds, including those incentives which promote management's willingness towards corporate delinquency.
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Additionally, principal-agent analysis can provide a useful prophylactic to aid in proposing means by which managerial misdeeds can be constrained by appropriate alignment of the interests of the principals (owners) and agents (management, subsidiaries, subcontractors, etc.). Given this latter feature, we use this as our analytic tool in the remainder of this article.
In the competition law context, the misalignment of interests characteristic of principal-agent problems arises in three significant relationships:
(1) the employee-employer context;
(2) the parent-subsidiary context; and, (3) the contractor-subcontractor context.
The first relationship is not of great concern for our present purposes. Responsibility and liability for EU competition violations rests with the undertakings involved, the activities of the undertaking's employees are attributed to the undertaking, which in turn will be liable for any penalties arising from the employee's misdeeds. 44 Given that EU law imposes no personal liability on the employees, this regime leads to a classic divergence of interest between the employees (who can reap the benefits which accrue from cartelised activity, The other two relationships are our focus. From the perspective of principal-agent analysis, these two relationships are structurally identical to the undertaking-employee paradigm. Both involve a principal (a parent firm or a contractor) and an agent (subsidiary or subcontractor) with incompletely aligned interests, and a varying degree of control that the principal can exercise over the agent. And both involve a different solution to the Coasian "make or buy" decision described above. The case law on an undertaking's responsibility for its employees is clear; but there is confusion-and hence room for improvement-in its treatment of parental liability for the competition infractions of its subsidiaries. And, in spite of (or due to) the recent judgement in Remonts 48 is somewhat more muddled, thus clamouring for further refinement. We explain and explore this below.
FAILURE TO EXERCISE NEGATIVE CONTROL AND ANTITRUST LIABILITY (a) Presumptions and the Nature of Control
In competition matters control is everything. Control, we noted, drives liability under Articles 101 and 102 the restrictions on undertakings' ability to merge and form joint ventures. As indicia of control the sorts of characteristics identified by the Commission are of varying probative value, and always remain rebuttable. Even a 100% shareholding is-in theory-rebuttable. 49 However, it must be noted that notwithstanding this theoretical nature, 47 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/17; Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) deserve an even greater degree of human rights protection than corporate persons. But this is not a concern for our present purposes. Our concern is with regard to parental liability of corporate subsidiaries. In all cases we consider, our "parents" are corporate entities of one form or another, and not natural persons.
Third, a system whereby parental entities are held to be responsible (and hence liable)
for the misconduct of their subsidiaries provides not just an efficient means of controlling corporate conduct, but parental liability is also consistent with our normative intuitions or more precisely put, the subsidiary's management acts as agents of the parent's owners (possibly mediated through the further agency of the parent's management). As the same issues arise in the control of both individual and corporate agents, the resolution to these two issues is identical. Accordingly, in the next part we craft an argument for parental liability based on the insights which vicarious corporate liability provide.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND DUE DILIGENCE
In this part, we develop a model for corporate liability for subsidiaries and subcontractors. 62 This model is based on a model of corporate liability which attributes conduct of employees to their firm, and extends that model to situations where the actions of subsidiaries and contractors are also attributed to the parental or contracting firm. The insight driving this model is control, and holding those entities which had the ability to exercise control (over employees, subsidiaries or sub-contractors) responsible for their failure to exercise control, in appropriate circumstances. The appropriate circumstances, we suggest, are when the parental or contracting entity had the ability to implement cost-effective monitoring and compliance measures, yet failed to do so.
(a) The Goals of Corporate Liability
Our earlier, discussion of the nature of the firm yielded two observations. First, given the structure of corporate conduct, the behaviour of two parties must be considered: the owners and their subordinates, the latter of whom are entrusted with carrying out decisions made by the former. And, second, corporate wrongdoing will frequently emanate from the instructions or decisions of the owners or this wrongdoing can be the result of actions taken by subordinates. gives rise to the imposition of a correlative duty to monitor these activities in order to effectively internalise these costs to the greatest degree possible. The attribution of responsibility for an agent's actions to the principal, when the principal reaps the benefits (or at least is the intended beneficiary of some of the benefits), satisfies our intuitive moral view that "he who gains, should pay-or at least be responsible."
This norm is consistent with (and is a consequence of) the basic tenets of both deontological and consequentialist ethical philosophies. A moral actor, who fails to bear the costs of their own actions thereby imposing them on others, runs afoul of the Kantian proscription not to use others as means. Likewise, the internalisation of responsibility and costs of an action to the benefitting actor underlies most of the thinking on consequentialistbased views of risk bearing and spreading.
(b) Corporate Liability: Strict versus Negligence-Based
An adequate and principled system of corporate liability will have the effect of deterring malfeasance of both the principals and agents, and will do so in a manner where the costs and responsibility of such deterrence falls as much as possible upon the principal. This distribution of costs fulfils the above described normative desiderata. Strict liability has the advantage that when the interests of the agents are aligned with those of the principal, it induces the agents to avoid misbehaviour. This is easily seen, as in a situation when principals' and agents' interests are aligned, any costs-financial or otherwise-are borne by both, and hence both have an incentive to avoid these costs. Provided that the costs of monitoring are less than the costs of (prevented) misbehaviour, there is an incentive for the principal to engage in monitoring activity to avoid the costs of the agent's misbehaviour. 63 However, this cost proviso-as we will see below 64 -has significant implications for the choice of rules governing the corporate liability regime.
A negligence regime lies in contrast to a strict liability regime. In a negligence regime, the conduct of the principal is under a duty of care to supervise for the agent's conduct; and the principal is liable for breaches of this duty. It is a defence for the principal to suggest that it had no duty to monitor the agent's conduct at the level in question. In a 63 See Arlen and Kraakman, and Arlen ibid. strict liability regime, on the other hand, the principal is responsible (liable) for all harms occasioned by its agent, irrespective of how "well" the principal monitors and controls its agent. A defence based on cost (or "duty of care") is unavailable.
There is a significant amount of literature which attempts to assess the relative efficacy of these regimes which demonstrates neither is strictly preferable over the other.
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The reason for this lack of dominance of one regime rests in the two goals inherent in a system of corporate liability (the activity level goal and the enforcement goal), which imposes conflicting ends for the system of liability as a whole.
(i) Strict Liability
The activity level goal is to ensure that an entity engages in an appropriate amount of an activity, in a market system this is the amount that would be produced when the cost of the product reflected its full cost of production, including all social costs. Accordingly, if this were the sole goal, a corporate liability regime would insist on the internalisation of all costs, and in particular those social costs (including costs of sanctions) of criminal activity, to the product. This ensures optimal production of the product. forego an internal policing system and expend the foregone costs of monitoring and compliance on satisfying penalties (or litigation in an attempt to reduce penalties).
(ii) Negligence-Based Liability
The solution to this problem may be to adopt a fault-based system of "optimal" or "efficient" monitoring. In such a system, a standard of care for monitoring is important. The standard which ought to be required is that the firms are to monitor their agents until that point where the marginal cost of additional monitoring exceeds the marginal cost of the (undetected and) unprevented social harm. Under this standard, firms will have the incentive to efficiently motor their agent's activities, and their agents will comprehend that the firm has this incentive, thereby guaranteeing the credibility of the monitoring programme.
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The standard we suggest is nothing more than Hand J's formula in U. S. v Carroll Towing Company, 70 in which the court was asked to consider the standard of care to be taken to avoid liability for damages for a vessel breaking its moorings. The Court developed the following algebraic formulation:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
68 See ibid 707-9 and Arlen (n 63) at 842-3. 69 See Arlen and Kraakman ibid 712-7.
70 159 F 2d 169 (CA2 1947).
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.
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The Hand formula imposes duty to expend efficiently in harm prevention.
This formula requires expenditure in harm prevention up to the amount equalling the expected cost of the harm (i.e., the Probability of Harm multiplied by the Cost of Harm).
Accordingly, the rule imposes liability in cases where the defendant under-invested in harm prevention. More significantly, however, the formula does not require wasteful overinvestment in safety, which would occur where the expenditure in safety would exceed the expected loss. As such, this formula is consistent with our moral beliefs regarding not wasting resources. 72 The expenditure in harm prevention is the cost of the firm's compliance programmes, with the harm to be prevented consisting of the economic harm (in particular, appropriated consumer surplus and deadweight losses 73 ) resulting from the firm's participation in the cartel.
However, a rule of liability which mandates that a firm only incur costs which would be efficiently expended in thwarting wrongdoing, fails to require a firm to internalise all social costs of its activities. As a fault-based system of policing requires the corporation to be responsible only in the event that it failed to detect (and prevent) wrongdoing that it could 71 Ibid at 173. efficiently prevent, such a system recognizes that the firm will not be responsible for those costs of its activities which it could not efficiently detect (and prevent) . In other words, where the costs of preventing the harm exceed the expected costs of the harm itself, the Hand formula recognises that such expenditure is a waste of resources. Accordingly, the rule does not impose liability when the prevention of harm is wasteful.
The result is thus: a negligence-based rule requiring principals to monitor their agent's conduct will ensure efficient expenditure on monitoring costs, and should prevent social harms the expected costs of which do not exceed their monitoring costs. We recognise there will be residual social harm, the prevention of which would have requires an inefficient expenditure of resources (i.e., the cost of preventing such harms exceeded their expected costs). However, this is not unique to corporate monitoring. Uneconomically preventable harm is a consequence of every potentially harmful activity.
(c) Conclusion: A System of Liability with a Negligence-Based Defence
Given the conflicting goals of full cost internalisation and cost-efficient monitoring, there can be no resolution to the dilemma which arises from the existence of an activity level goal (ensuring that the actor engages in the correct amount of an activity) and an enforcement goal (ensuring that an optimal level of expenditure on enforcement). If, however, the requirement for full cost internalisation is relaxed and thus the enforcement goal is preferred over the activity level goal, an alternative system of legal liability may be proposed. This system recognises the social value which results when firms both police their agents and reports their agents' misdeeds. This system would impose vicarious liability on the firm for its agents' misdeeds, and attribute these misdeeds to the firm on the basis of a strict liability regime. However, a defence will be provided. The defence will be the existence of a costefficient (from the perspective of the Hand formula) monitoring and compliance programme.
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74 This is similar (but not identical) to the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines' provisions regarding corporate compliance programmes as a mitigating factor in sentencing (see the Sentencing Guidelines § § 8B2.1 and 8C2.5). However, in the US "due diligence" mitigates the punishment; in our model, a cost-effect compliance programme acts as a complete defence.
The advantages of this proposed system are clear. The use of vicarious liability to attribute an agent's actions absolutely to the firm provides an incentive for the firm to prevent its agents' misbehaviour. This use of vicarious liability for attributing conduct (and hence responsibility) also satisfies our intuition that the beneficiary of an activity (here, the firm) pays for the costs of that activity (here, the agents' misdeeds). However, by providing a defence of "efficient monitoring," the model incentivises optimal expenditure on antitrust compliance.
But beyond satisfying the "who gains, pays" intuition, there is a broader social appeal to the proposed model, given its incentive for optimal private expenditure in antitrust compliance. The argument for this is as follows. The level of antitrust enforcement in a jurisdiction is obtained through an expenditure of both private and public resources. We assume first that the same amount of compliance in a can be "bought" for the same sum of money (whether or not the source of the funds is private or public); and second, that the present system results in suboptimal private investment in compliance. The proposed system of liability will incentivise additional private spending on compliance, achieving the same social level of enforcement with less public funds. The "left over" public funds can be diverted elsewhere either within the relevant competition agency (e g to expedite merger decisions or advocacy work) or to other governmental expenditure.
But it may be the case that our first assumption is incorrect. It is possible that public expenditures purchase more compliance than private expenditures, or vice versa. To the extent that the former case is correct, then our model has the merit of not requiring private expenditure in compliance at a super-optimal level, and thereby waste resources. On the other hand, if it is the case that a greater level of compliance can be privately purchased, then the same level of enforcement can be obtained with less total (public plus private)
expenditure.
Alternatively, it may be the case that in at least some antitrust matters, private measures and investment may be more efficient in securing compliance, as it is likely to be less costly for firms to monitor themselves than to be subject to external monitoring. Firms have informational advantages over public authorities regarding their workings, their employees and subsidiaries, and the market environment in which their activities occur.
While public agencies may have access to some of this information, relative to the firms themselves they operate at a disadvantage. As such, it is a very reasonable assumption that private (internal) monitoring may well achieve the same level of compliance at a reduced cost. The administrative and judicial costs of determining whether or not the firm met the standard of care need not be expensive: the inquiry should only be directed at determining whether or not an obvious means of monitoring was omitted by the firm, and not-except in the hardest of cases (or "at the margin")-directed to a cost benefit analysis of the monitoring programme. This is a similar inquiry to the standard inquiry in a tort safety/negligence case, whereby the omission of an obvious precaution will justify a prima facie finding of negligence.
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Finally, the proposed model of liability, by using the Hand formula, incorporates an explicit cost/benefit analysis to determine the appropriate level of investment in antitrust compliance to accord a defence to the parental firm. We view this as entirely appropriate.
Given the rational, profit-maximising nature of corporate entities, if any entities act on costbenefit calculations, it is these which do. Indeed this insight motivates much of the analysis of how corporate malfeasance, particularly in antitrust matters, 78 should be contained.
CORPORATE LIABILITY: APPLICATION TO ANTITRUST MATTERS
The above suggested means of attributing liability in subsidiary and other agency situations is of little practical utility if it is significantly inconsistent with the present state of the law. Likewise, if the model is entirely consistent with the existing state of the law, our results would be trivial and uninteresting. In this part of the article, we examine the implications our suggestion have for the present state of EU law. In particular, we examine the implications our model has for the attribution of liability in three situations:
parent/subsidiary conduct, contractor/sub-contractor relationship, and situations in which a firm is "parked" with a financial institution where that institution passively holds the firm.
We find that in the first two cases, our model slightly diverges from the existing state of the law, and is consistent in the latter case. The variance between our model and the existing state of law thus shows room for reform. 78 See e g A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, "The Optimal Tradeoff between the formula) measures liability will ensue. The immediate implication is this is that any antitrust investigation is slightly broadened.
BMW Belgium 79
serves as an illustration of how our suggested approach would differ from the existing approach. The case concerned with cross-border sales of BMW cars, which were priced considerably lower in Belgium than in in remainder of the internal market. As a result of the price differential, sales from Belgium increased, and there was a corresponding drop in sales in other parts of the internal market (in particular in The Netherlands and Germany). In response to this, BMW Munich (the parent company) wrote to BMW Belgium in an effort to remind Belgian dealers of their contractual obligation not to sell to unauthorised dealers, although sales to non-Belgian domiciled individuals were permitted.
Ultimately, BMW Belgium sent its dealers instructions. These included, inter alia, the following direction:
Our view is therefore that in the present situation there is only one solution: henceforth no BMW dealer in Belgium will sell cars outside Belgium or to firms who propose to export them. Our solidarity and the protection of our network are at stake. This absolute solidarity of the BMW network and strict compliance with this sales policy should be convincing and will help to restore confidence in the Belgian BMW network. We therefore ask you to agree to the above proposals by signing the attached copy. BMW Munich felt that it could influence (if not determine) BMW Belgium's course of conduct, as is shown by the former's instructions issued to the latter. 83 In deciding the case, it appears that the Commission gave great weight to the fact that the subsidiary's actions were contrary to the parent's direction; as a result, it did not impose a fine on the parent.
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Under our proposed system, the Commission's inquiry would have been different.
Our system recognises that the parent's ability to issue instructions to the subsidiary is indicative of a parental assumption of an ability to control the subsidiary's conduct. Rather than excusing the parent firm from liability as a result of the subsidiary's disobedience (or "rogue behaviour"), our model would ask whether the parent could have cost-effectively prevented this sort of activity by the subsidiary. We suggest that obvious cost-effective measures could have been implemented (e g vetting-or even writing for BMW Belgiumthe proposed correspondence to dealers), and in these circumstances liability would attach to BMW Munich's conduct.
(b) Implications for Corporate Liability: Third-Party Agents
A system which attributes liability for the actions of subsidiaries to parental entities should be compared the attribution of liability in situations where a firm engages another firm to act as its agent. Ideally, the regime by which liability is attributed should treat this principal-agent case identically to a parent-subsidiary case. To do otherwise would establish incentives to choose a particular organisational structure to minimise antitrust liability. In particular, if it were more difficult for a firm to be held liable for the anticompetitive activities of its agents than its subsidiaries, then this provides incentives for to firms to use agents as a means of "contracting out" of antitrust liability.
In C-542/14 VM Remonts, the ECJ had an opportunity to consider the liability of a contractor for the anticompetitive conduct of its sub-contractor. The undertaking in question engaged the services of a sub-contractor to assist it in the preparation of a bid. The subcontractor, in turn, engaged in prohibited information-sharing with other undertakings involved in the same tender process. This situation is structurally identical to the principalagent situations exemplified in both the parent-subsidiary an employer-employee 83 See Burnley (n 81) at 607.
relationships; and, as in the latter two cases, there is varying opportunity for the principal to exercise control over its agent.
In his Opinion, AG Wathelet explicitly considered an undertaking's responsibility to supervise its sub-contractor to ensure that it would not engage in anti-competitive conduct while performing its contractual duties, and argued that negligent supervision should found an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. As such, the AG suggested, EU law should establish a rebuttable presumption of liability for acts contrary to competition law committed by third parties whose services the undertaking in question has contracted.
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As the Advocate General maintained, such a rebuttable presumption achieves the appropriate balance between ensuring the effectiveness of competition law while at the same time protecting the fundamental rights of the undertaking in question. 86 The assumption can be rebutted by the undertaking in question proving that it knew nothing of the anticompetitive behaviour of the third party, and that it took all necessary precautions to ensure the contractor's compliance with competition law. 87 Whether or not the undertaking in question has acted in a manner that is appropriate to rebut the presumption is a matter for the national court (in the instant case) to determine.
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AG Wathelet's insight in this case is that an undertaking should not be able to "subcontract" itself out of liability under the competition laws. Clearly, had the undertaking engaged in the sort of conduct performed by its sub-contractor, the undertaking would itself have been immediately (and unquestionably) [T]he answer to the question is that Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking may, in principle, be held liable for a concerted practice on account of the acts of an independent service provider supplying it with services only if one of the following conditions is met:
• the service provider was in fact acting under the direction or control of the undertaking concerned, or
• that undertaking was aware of the anti-competitive objectives pursued by its competitors and the service provider and intended to contribute to them by its own conduct, or
• that undertaking could reasonably have foreseen the anti-competitive acts of its competitors and the service provider and was prepared to accept the risk which they entailed.
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The obvious problem with the Court's holding is its reliance on foreseeability. In English law, foreseeability of consequences is used to limit responsibility and hence liability for damages. 92 The difficulty is that foreseeability is ultimately an arbitrary classification requiring an additional ingredient in order to permit principled attribution of liability. Magnitude of risk has been used in English Law as a means of achieving principled attribution. 94 Further, the Court's use of acceptance of risk as a necessary condition for liability to be founded on this branch is also problematic. "Acceptance" is a vague term, with meanings which could include "(contractual) agreement," "acquiescence," and "wilful blindness."
As problematic as the language chosen by the Court may be, the key to how this new rule fits into the EU's competition regime will be in how the rule's two branches mutually operate to ensure an appropriate level of enforcement (which includes monitoring). The test for principal's liability for the anti-competitive activities of should: (1) (at minimum) be consistent with the test of parental liability for the anti-competitive activities of their subsidiaries; and (2) (ideally) provide an inventive for principals to optimally monitor their sub-contractors to deter anti-competitive conduct.
Consistency should be the minimum standard expected of the legal rule in its operation. Should the principal/sub-contractor rule vary from the parent/subsidiary rule this will set up differing incentives to opt for a particular legal relationship. In particular should it be more difficult to attribute liability in a principal/sub-contractor case than in a parent/subsidiary case, this sets up incentives to use sub-contractors as a means of avoiding (or contracting out of) antitrust liability. Similarly, if the required standard of monitoring in principal/sub-contractor relationships exceeds the standard expected in parent/subsidiary relationships, this will impose additional transaction costs in engaging subcontractors with a consequent reduction in the efficiencies which could be generated through this practice.
It appears that under the Court's rule in Remonts, there is a functional divergence between the two standards, as well as between the standards and the rule governing the attribution of employee conduct. The rule governing parent/subsidiary liability focuses upon It has been said almost too frequently to require repetition that foreseeability of likely harm is not in itself a sufficient test of liability in negligence. Some further ingredient is invariably needed to establish the requisite proximity of relationship between plaintiff and defendant, and all the circumstances of the case must be carefully considered and analysed in order to ascertain whether such an ingredient is present.
94 See e g Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co (Wagon Mound No. 2) the positive control that the parent exercised over its subsidiary and uses rebuttable presumptions of share ownership to establish proof of control. As seen above, there is little focus on negative control, i.e. the parent's ability to prevent the anti-competitive conduct.
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In principal/sub-contractor matters, the keys for the Court are the foreseeability of the subcontractor's anticompetitive conduct and the principal's subsequent acceptance of the risk of the sub-contractor's conduct. Here there is little concern with control in either the positive or negative sense, the concern is merely with acceptance of foreseen consequences. Finally, in the case of employees, their conduct is immediately attributed to their employer: control (of either a positive or negative nature) and foreseeability is irrelevant.
(c) Implications for Corporate Liability: "Parking" and Pure Passive Holdings
The inquiry suggested above does not automatically entail that parental entities which have pure passive holdings in a firm (which is in turn involved in anticompetitive activity)
will be liable for the latter's anticompetitive activity. Given the need to prevent harmful effects to competition which may result from amalgamation, there is a need for means by which assets can be divested to prevent such effects, and that such divestiture can be achieved with as little cost as possible. "Parking" an asset with an investment bank or insurance company is frequently the most cost-effective means for a merging undertaking to rid itself of an asset. However, the firm with which the asset is parked has no interest in either running the parked firm as a long-term proposition. Rather, that firm is merely holding onto an asset until it can then dispose of it. It is a pure passive owner, with its ownership of the parked firm is analogous to holding the parked firm as inventory, rather than incorporating it into its existing structure as a going concern.
Accordingly, the organisational links between the firms are minimal to non-existent;
hence there is little opportunity to exercise control of either the positive or negative sort.
Additionally, one can also reasonably assume the expense of developing antitrust compliance measures to be put in place for the short period that the undertaking is parked with the financial holding company would impose significant transaction costs on any such proposed arrangement. Hence the non-imposition of liability in these circumstances is consistent with what we have determined to be the fundamental focus of inquiry in this model of 95 This is in contrast to the AG's proposal, which explicitly considered opportunities for (and failures in) monitoring; see n 87.
responsibility: the ability of the parent to prevent the subsidiary's activity through costefficient exercise of control.
(d) The Consistency of the Theoretical Model with EU Law
Testing the theoretical model described above against existing EU law serves at least two purposes. First, to the extent that there is divergence between the model and the existing law, the extent of this divergence is telling. If it is great, then the model may not be anchored in reality; if it is non-existent, then the model may be trivial: it describes reality, and not an optimal institution. Second, to the extent there is an acceptable divergence between the model and the state of the law, this is suggestive of a direction for reform. Nevertheless, a reduction of a fine in those circumstances in which the offence was negligently committed is contrary to ensuring cost-efficient internal monitoring of the activities of subsidiaries by their corporate parents. In the absence of an (inefficient) rule which imposes strict liability on a corporate parent, negligent supervision of a subsidiary occurs precisely because the parent has underinvested in monitoring and compliance. To subsequently discount the sanctions imposed on an undertaking because activities which ultimately resulted from underinvestment, perversely rewards this underinvestment.
The EU provisions surrounding leniency and confidentiality are somewhat consistent with the model. The first undertaking which self-reports and provides the Commission with specific and value-added 100 evidence of its participation in a cartel is entitled to immunity from fines, subject to a duty of on-going cooperation with the Commission's investigation.
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This is subject to the proviso that an applicant for complete immunity cannot have coerced other undertakings to join or remain in the cartel. 102 To the extent that this policy encourages undertakings to implement a credible (in the eyes of its employees, subsidiaries or other agents) policy of self-monitoring, EU law is consistent with our proposed regime. ; however, such access does not extend to leniency statements and settlement submissions. 107 Insofar as information contained in these sorts of documents is protected, provision of this in the context of self-reporting the results of internal monitoring will not enhance the civil liability of the undertaking in question. However, if undertakings believe that the self-monitoring and subsequent reporting process could place liability-enhancing evidence into plaintiff's counsel's hands via a disclosure process, this disclosure process becomes a disincentive to effective self-monitoring and hence internalising the costs of antitrust enforcement.
With main one exception, the model we have described in this section does not diverge significantly from the present state of EU law. The exception is the treatment of negligence in competition infringements. The Fining Guidelines allows for the possibility of a reduction in these sorts of cases, which is exactly the wrong response. As negligence arises from underinvestment in care, to reduce a penalty in these circumstances further rewards such underinvestment. Given that the wording of the Guidelines permits-rather than mandatessuch a fine reduction it is to be hoped that this discount will be used sparingly-if at all.
CONCLUSION
The suggestions made in this article are not merely "ivory tower" theorising. A system where liability is imposed on parental corporations for the anti-competitive activities of their subsidiaries is consistent with European case law and secondary legislation. Such a system also has sufficient fault-based justification to enable it to pass the Courts' test for In addition to this, parental negligence as a means of antitrust liability is workable under the present regime. A finding of an antitrust infringement by a subsidiary should trigger an inquiry about parental (non-)involvement. Where the parent holds 100 % (or close thereto) the existing case law, and resulting means by which parental liability is established, is adequate. Where there is a lesser shareholding, a sliding-scale rebuttable presumption of control can be used: the greater the shareholding, the greater the presumption of control and the greater the presumption that the parent could have acted in a manner to ensure antitrust compliance on the part of its subsidiary. Further, other indicia could and should be adopted as rebuttable presumptions of both positive and negative control.
The corollary of this rebuttable presumption is that the lower the shareholding, the easier the presumption should be to rebut. Indeed, not only does the requirement of "personal responsibility" demand this, but also imposing an excessively high of threshold on parents would compel an over-expenditure on monitoring costs. Such over-expenditure would in turn detract from a regime of socially optimal enforcement costs.
However, once control-either positive or negative-has been established, a due diligence defence may be available to the parental undertaking. If that undertaking can establish that it took sufficient precautions to ensure the antitrust compliance of its subsidiaries, this should either serve as a defence to the complaint, or alternatively as grounds for a reduction of any fine. 108 Accordingly this defence ties the personal responsibility of the parental entity to a duty of oversight of the activities of its subsidiary or contractor. This tie, in a very real way, serves to address any human rights considerations raised by liability without responsibility.
The extension of EU parental liability in competition matters to include liability for negligent oversight of subsidiaries thus provides for more effective regime for the prevention of antitrust violations. Incentivising parental firms to oversee their subsidiaries (irrespective of their actual ownership level of them) enhances antitrust enforcement by internalising such enforcement efforts, in the same way that attributing liability to undertakings for the actions of their employees enhances such efforts. While there is some related case law, 109 the paucity of litigated matters may reflect the Commission's enforcement policy. If indeed this is the case, it is submitted, this policy needs to be reconsidered. This reconsideration is particularly 108 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines (n 47), point 29.
